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The war of nerves with Iran – 
consequences for the South Caucasus and Russia
Krzysztof Strachota
Tensions over Iran’s nuclear programme have risen considerably in recent 
months. This has been visible in numerous threats of – and much spe-
culation about – an imminent Israeli (and US) attack on Iran’s nuclear 
installations. In this context, the support for the attacks that the countries 
of the South Caucasus (and Azerbaijan in particular) could provide has 
been the subject of lively debate, as has been the prospect of a Russian 
political and military offensive in the Caucasus in response to the attacks 
on Iran. It seems that the ongoing war campaign in the media has been 
aimed primarily at putting pressure on Iran and the international commu-
nity to find a political solution to the Iranian problem. This also applies to 
the Caucasus’s involvement in the campaign. 
Given the outcome of the Istanbul round of talks on a political solution to 
the Iranian issue (14 April), which warrants moderate optimism, the threat 
of a conflict now appears more distant and this also indirectly proves the 
effectiveness of the campaign. The war of nerves with Iran, however, is al-
ready now actually affecting the stability of the Southern Caucasus. While it 
seems that Azerbaijan is not Israel’s partner in the preparations to attacks, 
and that there is no real link between the Iranian problem and the ongoing 
and planned movements of Russian troops in the Caucasus, the tensions 
between Iran and Azerbaijan are indeed high. Moreover, the global image of 
the Caucasus is deteriorating, the USA’s position in the region is becoming 
more complicated, and Russia’s room for manoeuvre is expanding.
A virtual attack on Iran with the Caucasus in the background
Since at least the beginning of 2012, the international media have been making clear the 
increasingly strong conviction that a military intervention in Iran – to be carried out by Israel 
on its own or with the United States – is imminent. The objective of the attacks would be to 
stop the Iranian nuclear programme (which in Israel and the West is commonly considered 
to have a military nature). The maximum objective could be regime change in Iran. These 
concerns have been based on the open threats against Iran – voiced by Israel and widely 
commented on by analysts and the media – which have been substantiated by movements 
of armed forces in Iran’s vicinity.
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Support for the planned operation would supposedly be provided by the South Caucasus. 
The Israeli press and US think tanks have reported that Azerbaijan (or possibly Georgia) 
would be prepared to make their airfields available for use by Israel, which has no common 
border with Iran. The reports on the close co-operation between Israel and Azerbaijan are 
thought to have been indirectly corroborated by the recent arms supply contracts they have 
concluded, worth US$ 1.6 billion, and the fact that Azeri and Georgian security services 
have foiled attempted attacks, blamed on Iranians, against a rabbi and the headmaster of 
an Israeli school in Baku, and the Israeli ambassador in Tbilisi (January 2012). 
Meanwhile, US websites (quoting the Russian Ministry of Defence) and, almost simultaneously, 
the Russian press, began to speculate about Russia’s preparations for a war with Georgia in the 
event of an Israeli/US intervention in Iran. The impulse and pretext for such a war would come from 
the deployment of US forces in the Caucasus, 
expected in the event of a conflict with Iran 
(Russia has always resolutely and strongly 
opposed such deployment), and the need 
to reinforce the allied defences of Armenia. 
The hypothesis about Russia’s preparations 
to an intervention in the Caucasus is supposed to be corroborated by the considerable reinforce-
ment of Russia’s Southern Military District, the evacuation of the families of the military serving 
at the Russian base in Gyumri, Armenia, and the activities undertaken within the framework of the 
Kavkaz 2012 military exercise to be held this summer (involving, among others, the Russian forces 
stationed in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Armenia). 
While a military operation against targets in Iran cannot be ruled out completely, at this 
stage the threat of an operation of this kind appears to be primarily an instrument of political 
pressure on Iran and, indirectly, on global public opinion. The threat of an armed interven-
tion in Iran has recurred on many occasions since at least as early as 2002; the intention 
being to persuade Tehran to voluntarily give up its military nuclear programme (which Israel 
treats as a threat to its existence while Iran denies the programme exists) and to submit its 
civilian nuclear programme to strict international control. 
The current wave of threats aimed at Iran has preceded a new round of negotiations, 
resumed after a break of more than one year, between Iran and ‘the Six’ (the US, Russia, 
China, France, Great Britain and Germany). The first talks were held in January 2012 and 
the second meeting took place in Istanbul on 14 April; the war campaign in the media ap-
pears to have been conducted with these negotiations in mind. The Istanbul talks ended 
in moderate optimism (a new meeting is planned on 23 May in Baghdad), which defers 
the possibility of the threatened attack against Iran actually taking place.
The prospect of a war with Iran and the chaos it would entail appear to be particularly sug-
gestive now in connection with the US presidential elections in November. The Iranian prob-
lem and the question of Israel’s security have always been fixed elements in US presidential 
campaigns; the reactions of the US administration as it prepares itself to the election are 
not obvious and are particularly heavily dependent on the internal context, and the room for 
independent action by Israel is exceptionally large. 
The war campaign in the media (initiated by Israel) is addressed not only to Iran, but also 
to the international community. In a situation defined by the global economic crisis, deep 
instability in the Middle East (including the Arab Spring) and uncertainty over Washington’s 
policy, the threat of a new conflict which is bound to drive oil prices up, to destabilise Iran’s 
entire neighbourhood and escalate tensions between world powers (including Russia and 
the USA) is designed to mobilise the world to exert political and economic pressure on Iran. 
The atmosphere of danger is intended to make the world accustomed to the idea of conflict 
and at the same time to prepare it for its possible outbreak.
The speculations about Azerbaijan’s 
potential involvement in an open con-
flict with Iran appear to be unfounded. 
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South Caucasus and Russia on the Iranian crisis
Even if the threat of an Israeli/US armed intervention in Iran remains hypothetical at this 
stage (and it is on this hypothetical basis that successive layers of speculations are being 
built), the crisis over Iran has been really and significantly affecting the situation in the 
South Caucasus and on Russian policy. The ongoing war campaign in the media has been 
heightening the tension and highlighting questions about these countries’ role and potential 
in the crisis.
The South Caucasus
As a regional power and a neighbour, Iran is a significant point of reference for the South 
Caucasus, albeit not the most important one. Armenia and Georgia maintain friendly rela-
tions with Tehran. For Armenia, Iran is an important economic partner and, with its borders 
with Azerbaijan and Turkey closed, its ‘window to the world’. In the strategic dimension, 
Iran’s potential counterbalances the informal anti-Armenian alliance between Azerbaijan and 
Turkey. Georgia also maintains lively economic and political contacts with Iran, despite its 
ostensibly pro-American attitude. The tensions over Iran have considerably complicated the 
situation of both Armenia and Georgia. They have both been trying to ease those tensions 
which fall within the scope of their limited possibilities. For example, Tbilisi has firmly denied 
any involvement in preparations to the attack, and has rejected Israeli allegations that the 
attempted attack on the Israeli ambassador in Tbilisi, foiled in January, was inspired by Iran. 
Azerbaijan’s relations with Iran are much worse than those of Armenia and Georgia. A con-
tinuing problem in bilateral relations concerns ‘Iranian Azerbaijan’ (two provinces in Iran, 
together larger and more populous than 
Azerbaijan itself), towards which Baku is 
pursuing a revisionist policy according to 
Tehran. Among the accusations made by 
Baku, on the other hand, are claims that 
Tehran is inciting and supporting Islamic 
radicalism in Azerbaijan and informally 
supporting the Armenians in the Nagorno- 
-Karabakh conflict. Tension between the 
two states has flared up on several occasions, including the dispute – which involved the use 
of force – over oil deposits in the Caspian Sea. Presently, Baku is firmly refuting speculation 
that it would make its airfields available to Israel for use in an attack on Iran (even if talks on 
the subject have been held, it is hardly likely that Azerbaijan would wish to continue them in 
the current situation). Baku has also reliably pointed to the conflict with Armenia as the main 
reason for its arms purchases, including from Israel (and supplies under the contracts are to 
be spread over many years anyway). This does not change the fact that Iran has been ac-
cusing Azerbaijan of supporting Israel’s subversive activities. For instance, it has alleged that 
the assassination of an Iranian scientist linked to the nuclear programme in January 2012 
was planned and carried out from Azerbaijan. It is also a fact that several dozens of people 
(including Iranian nationals) have been arrested in Azerbaijan on charges of: involvement in 
preparations to assassinate a Baku rabbi and the head of an Israeli school in Baku (January 
2012), the organisation of terror networks with links to Iran, and arms smuggling from Iran. 
The political rhetoric of the two countries’ political relations has also become considerably 
tougher. Nevertheless, the speculations about Azerbaijan’s potential involvement in an open 
conflict with Iran appear to be unfounded. This is evident in, inter alia, the disproportion 
of power in favour of Iran, the absence of any external guarantees of Azerbaijan’s security 
The main consequences of the current 
wave of the Iranian crisis for the South 
Caucasus could be that the region’s 
importance in the policy of the US 
will decrease, thus expanding Russia’s 
room for manoeuvre in the region.
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(and Israel’s instrumental attitude towards Azerbaijan), as well as the priority of the Nagorno- 
-Karabakh problem in Baku’s policy, the need to ensure the security of resource extraction 
and transmission infrastructure, and Baku’s traditional caution in foreign policy.
The crisis over Iran and the prospect of a deepening destabilisation of the South Caucasus 
engendered by it point to the special importance of Russia (which treats the region as its 
exclusive sphere of influence) and the USA (which challenges Russia in the region and is 
regarded as a counterbalance) in the context of the internal factors that affect the policies of 
the individual countries in the region.
The main challenges currently faced by the countries of the region are related to Russia. 
In the case of Armenia and Azerbaijan, this means in particular the unregulated and 
‘unfreezing’ conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, viewed as Russia’s main instrument to put pres-
sure on the two states. Neither a hypothetical renewed outbreak of the war over Nagorno-
Karabakh nor a peace agreement are possible without the involvement of Russia, and both 
would inevitably entail attempts by Russia to use Nagorno-Karabakh to further strengthen 
its position. Moscow also retains a significant influence on key internal issues in the two 
states: the political scene in Armenia and, indirectly, the radical Islamic groups with links to 
the North Caucasus, which are operating in Azerbaijan (a new wave of arrests took place 
in April 2012).
For Georgia, Russia poses a genuine threat to the existence of its statehood in the current 
shape, a threat that materialised in the 2008 war, the de facto incorporation of Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia into the Russian political and military space and Moscow’s overtly spelled 
out ambitions to oust the pro-Western leadership that has ruled Georgia since 2003. Given 
the huge political and social tensions accompanying the upcoming parliamentary elections 
(October 2012) and presidential elections 
(2013), Tbilisi indeed considers Russia to 
possess the political will and a powerful 
arsenal of means to destabilise the situa-
tion in Georgia.
For all the countries of the South Cauca-
sus the tensions over Iran, and especially 
a possible armed intervention in Iran, are 
therefore a portent of increased Russian activity in the region.
From the point of view of the South Caucasus, besides the concerns related to Russia, 
the calculations concerning the positioning of the United States are the biggest worry since 
it provides a natural counterbalance to Russia in the South Caucasus and is the strategic 
patron of Georgia’s pro-Western policy and the energy and political interests of Azerbaijan. 
The Russian-Georgian war in 2008 exposed Washington’s serious limitations in the region. 
The growing importance of the Iranian issue threatens to marginalise and further instrumen-
talise the South Caucasus in US policy, while the importance of Russia in calculations re-
garding Iran (and in NATO’s withdrawal from Afghanistan by the end of 2014) will increase. 
The US presidential campaign will probably further reduce the significance of the region in 
US policy. This prediction is indirectly substantiated by, inter alia, the tone of speculations 
by the media and analysts about the consequences attacks against Iran would have for the 
South Caucasus, which do not mention any strengthening of the US presence in the region. 
Thus, in addition to the growing importance of Russia, the main consequences of the cur-
rent wave of the Iranian crisis for the South Caucasus could be that the region’s importance 
in the policy of the US (and more broadly the West) will decrease, thus expanding Russia’s 
room for manoeuvre in the region.
For all the countries of the South 
Caucasus the tensions over Iran, and 
especially a possible armed interven-
tion in Iran, are therefore a portent of 
increased Russian activity in the region.
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Russia
The Iranian problem is one of the most important issues in Russia’s foreign policy. Moscow 
views its involvement in the process of resolving the problem as a confirmation of its global 
power status. As for Iran itself, Moscow does not perceive it as a direct threat to Russia 
(even if Iran were to arm itself with nuclear warheads). This allows Moscow to pursue 
a flexible policy. On the one hand, Russia opposes the militarization of the Iranian nuclear 
programme and on several occasions has endorsed sanctions against Iran at the UN Secu-
rity Council. On the other hand, however, it approves of Iran’s civilian nuclear programme 
and resolutely opposes any military action against Iran. What is really at stake for Russia in 
the Iranian issue does not concern Iran itself, but rather the United States: Russia wishes 
to keep the appearance of balance and symmetry between itself and the United States and 
to minimise the strategic gains that the crisis over Iran could allow the US to make. In Mos-
cow’s view, the main threat to its interests from the US concerns the potential expansion 
of America’s role and presence in its direct vicinity, e.g. in the South Caucasus or Central 
Europe (for instance as part of the anti-missile shield programme, for which the Iranian 
nuclear programme is a formal pretext).
The optimum scenario for Russia would be to maintain the status quo with regard to the Ira-
nian issue, i.e. to avoid a solution to the Iranian problem while allowing neither full normali-
sation nor war. Such an outcome would confirm Russia’s global position, would practically 
eliminate competition from Iran as a supplier of energy resources to Europe (while boosting 
oil prices), and would not undermine Moscow’s bilateral relations with Tehran, thus allowing 
it to play the Iranian crisis to its benefit in 
relations with the West and, to a lesser ex-
tent, with other states, for instance China.
Should the attacks take place, Russia 
would find itself in an uncertain situa-
tion. It would suffer a blow to its prestige, 
a very important aspect in Russia’s policy: 
the attacks would expose the weakness of Russia and its inability to stop the United States 
from taking unilateral action (which Russia has no capacity to prevent) and would under-
mine the legitimacy of the UN Security Council, membership in which serves as an attrac-
tive yardstick of Russia’s status as a global power. The possible deployment of major US 
forces in the South Caucasus and the prospect of their permanent presence there would 
constitute a very serious and real blow to Russia. While there are no indications at this stage 
that such a deployment will take place, for Russia it remains invariably the most serious 
potential threat to its position in the region. 
If they do not lead to regime change, the attacks against Iran would also offer Russia some 
benefits, which, in the short term, could compensate for the prestige losses. These could 
include higher prices of energy resources and the short-term weakening of competitors, 
more options for Moscow to obstruct US policies (e.g. with regard to Afghanistan), an im-
provement of Russia’s own image in the Middle East (as a result of a rise in anti-American 
sentiments), or the ‘right’ to protect Russia’s interest in the post-Soviet area in an equally 
unilateral and undiplomatic way (by analogy to Moscow’s reaction to the recognition of 
Kosovo’s independence, when Russia responded by intervening in Georgia and recognising 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2008). The prospect of a possible concentration of US efforts 
on Iran, at the expense of US interests in the South Caucasus, which has been underlined in 
media speculations about the consequences of an attack on Iran and has received particular 
attention in Russia, seems to suggest that this is indeed the attitude that Russia will adopt. 
While all the above factors are affecting Russia’s policy towards the Iranian issue, there is no 
indication that Moscow perceives the prospect of attacks against Iran as imminent and una-
There is also no real link between 
the alleged preparations to a war 
with Iran and the movements 
of Russian troops in the Caucasus. 
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voidable. Its protests against the possible intervention are routine. There is also no real link 
between the alleged preparations to a war with Iran and the movements of Russian troops 
in the Caucasus. The ongoing reinforcement of Russian army units in the region, including 
in Armenia, is a direct consequence of the reforms started in the mid-2000s and intensified 
after the war in Georgia, whose primary objective is to professionalise and technologically 
modernise the Russian army. The dismantling of the army’s redundant post-Soviet logistics 
backup, which includes the returns of demobbed officers and their families from the Gyumri 
base in Armenia, is also part of this process. Likewise, the Kavkaz military exercises have 
been organised regularly every two years 
since the mid-2000s according to relative-
ly fixed scenarios. A new attack on Geor-
gia could hypothetically follow this year’s 
exercise (as was the case in 2008), but 
the current condition of the Russian army 
allows it to attack even without such prep-
arations, and the Russian armed forces 
certainly do not need preparations starting 
a few months in advance. A new Russian 
attack on Georgia is unlikely to happen be-
fore the parliamentary elections in Georgia 
this October (with the presidential election 
following in 2013), in which Russia can 
hope to achieve its political objectives of 
removing the current leadership from power and undermining Georgia’s credibility in the 
West without resorting to an all-out armed intervention.
In this context, the Iranian problem is not so much the cause of developments in Russia’s 
Caucasus policy, as a convenient justification and post factum reinforcement of this policy: 
it strengthens the credibility of military pressure on Georgia, increases political pressure on 
Azerbaijan and offers an opportunity to downplay America’s role in the region and to deter 
a hypothetical US military deployment in the Caucasus.
Consequences and forecasts
Speculations about the Israeli and US intervention in Iran at this stage appear to be primar-
ily a way to put pressure on Iran and the international community in connection with the 
ongoing negotiations concerning the Iranian nuclear programme. Attacks are unlikely to 
take place before the Baghdad round of talks on 23 May, which both Iran and the Six are 
approaching with moderate optimism and hopes for a compromise. Therefore, speculation 
about a Russian response in the South Caucasus is purely hypothetical for now. The risk of 
a conflict with Iran would increase should the negotiations fail, and will become more sig-
nificant towards the end of the presidential campaign in the US – unless the Israeli attack is 
fully agreed on with Washington or if Jerusalem chooses to confront the US with the attack 
as a fait accompli. 
As regards the South Caucasus, while it is certain that Russia will seek to destabilise 
the situation in Georgia in the coming months, the threat of open conflict will only increase 
in the following situations: if the outcome of the October general election in Georgia is unfa-
vourable to Russia, when the presidential campaign in the US draws to a close, or just after 
the presidential elections if the Republican candidate wins. However, the attack is not a sce-
nario that is definitely going to materialise, since internal instability in Georgia will continue 
at least until the presidential elections in 2013. 
The Iranian problem is not so much 
the cause of developments in Russia’s 
Caucasus policy, as a convenient jus-
tification and post factum reinforce-
ment of this policy: it strengthens 
the credibility of military pressure on 
Georgia, increases political pressure 
on Azerbaijan and offers an opportu-
nity to downplay America’s role in the 
region and to deter a hypothetical US 
military deployment in the Caucasus.
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Even though armed intervention remains hypothetical at this stage, the tensions over Iran 
are already adversely affecting stability in the South Caucasus. This concerns the real con-
flicts between Iran and Azerbaijan and the ongoing confrontation between Israel and Iran 
in which Azerbaijan is being used. As an indirect consequence of the war campaigns in the 
media, the global image of the South Caucasus is deteriorating as the region appears to be 
more unstable and threatened by conflicts, objectified and helpless in the games played by 
the global powers, and losing its importance in Western – especially US – policy. This could 
adversely affect internal developments in the countries of the region (in particular the Geor-
gian elections) and their mutual relations (mainly in the context of the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict). Should the intervention in Iran actually take place, the threat that the region might 
become an area of direct conflict would adversely affect the image of Azerbaijan as a secure 
supplier of energy resources to the EU and intermediary for other Caspian states. In that 
situation, Russian pressure on the region would increase considerably.
In the current phase of the tensions over Iran, Russia’s international position is strengthening 
and its room for political manoeuvre is expanding. The ongoing negotiations with Iran and 
the creation of successive instruments to put pressure on Tehran place Russia, a permanent 
member of the UN Security Council, at the centre of a process that influences its relations 
with the US, Iran and the Middle East (vitally interested in the Iranian problem and strongly 
distancing itself from Russia in connection with the situation in Syria). While it is hardly de-
sirable for Moscow, the threatened armed intervention in Iran will not eliminate Russia from 
regional power games. On the contrary, it will open up a number of new options, the most 
tangible of which will be the opportunity to reinforce Russia’s position in the South Cauca-
sus (and, indirectly, also in Central Europe, should the current justification for the creation 
of the anti-missile shield disappear) at the expense of the US, and to gain a stronger position 
in the energy market.
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